Complex problem solving—single ability or complex phenomenon? by Wolfgang Schoppek & Andreas Fischer
OPINION
published: 05 November 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01669
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1669
Edited by:
Guy Dove,
University of Louisville, USA
Reviewed by:
Dirk U. Wulff,
Max Planck Institute for Human
Development, Germany
Philipp Sonnleitner,
University of Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
*Correspondence:
Wolfgang Schoppek
wolfgang.schoppek@uni-bayreuth.de
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 30 March 2015
Accepted: 16 October 2015
Published: 05 November 2015
Citation:
Schoppek W and Fischer A (2015)
Complex problem solving—single
ability or complex phenomenon?
Front. Psychol. 6:1669.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01669
Complex problem solving—single
ability or complex phenomenon?
Wolfgang Schoppek 1* and Andreas Fischer 2
1Department of Education, Bayreuth University, Bayreuth, Germany, 2 Institute of Psychology, Heidelberg University,
Heidelberg, Germany
Keywords: complex problem solving, individual differences, content validity, dynamic decision making
In recent years, large scale assessments such as PISA (OECD, 2014) have revived the interest
in complex problem solving (CPS). In accordance with the constraints of such assessments, the
focus was narrowed to psychometric aspects of the concept, and the minimal complex systems test
MicroDYN has been propagated as an efficient instrument for measuring individual differences in
CPS (Wüstenberg et al., 2012; Greiff et al., 2013). At present, MicroDYN is the most common
psychometric instrument claiming to measure CPS1. MicroDYN consists of a number of linear
systems with mostly three input and three output variables. The subjects have to explore each
system, enter their insights into a causal diagram (representation phase) and subsequently steer
the system to a given array of target values by entering input values (solution phase). Each system
is attended to for about 5min. MicroDYN yields reliable measures.
However, the validity of the approach is controversial. Funke (2014) has cautiously argued
against the dominance of MicroDYN in the field of CPS. He pointed out that causal cognition plays
a different role in the control of minimal complex systems than in the control of more complex
and naturalistic systems. Therefore, according to Funke, CPS should not only be studied using
minimal complex systems, but also with more realistic and complex simulated microworlds such
as the Tailorshop (Danner et al., 2011a). Greiff and Martin (2014) countered that research with
these microworlds has not succeeded in identifying “CPS as an unobserved latent attribute (i.e., a
psychological concept)” (p.1).
The dispute between Funke (2014) and Greiff and Martin (2014) reflects the conflict between
process-oriented vs. psychometric approaches to CPS2. In the present paper, we follow up on
these two articles and add the notion that construing CPS as a single latent attribute might
be unwarranted regarding the original and prevalent theoretical conception. In fact, originally,
MicroDYN had not been constructed to measure CPS per se; rather it was devised as a
“psychometric sound realization of selected but important CPS aspects” (Funke, 2010, p.138).
Speaking of CPS as a latent attribute also obscures findings that MicroDYN assesses two
discriminable—yet highly correlated—of these aspects (Wüstenberg et al., 2012; Greiff and Fischer,
2013; Fischer et al., 2015): knowledge acquisition, and knowledge application. Even though these
aspects can be reliably assessed by MicroDYN they are not representative for CPS in general and
there is more to CPS than MicroDYN does address (Fischer, 2015). In our opinion, “complex
problem solving” is a multifaceted cognitive activity (Funke, 2014) rather than a single “latent
attribute” (Greiff and Martin, 2014, p.1). We will present a number of arguments supporting this
position and make suggestions for the further development of the field.
1For simplicity, we subsume the microworld GeneticsLab (Sonnleitner et al., 2013) under the MicroDYN approach because
of its close similarity to MicroDYN.
2Please see Buchner (1995) for a detailed discussion of different approaches to CPS. The mentioned conflict has a
long-standing equivalent in intelligence research, where information-processing approaches, which strive to discover the
“mechanics of intelligence” (Hunt, 2011, p.140), compete with psychometric approaches.
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(1) Our first argument is based on the definition of CPS and
the characteristic features of complex problems typically used
in research: There is a problem whenever an organism wants
to reach a goal but does not know how to do so (Duncker
and Lees, 1945); and a problem is complex if a large number
of highly interrelated aspects have to be considered in parallel
(Dörner, 1997; Fischer et al., 2012). Problem solving is the
activity of searching for a solution. The range of complex
problems is heterogeneous and many researchers have noted
that it is hard to define exhaustively the common features
of the problems used (e.g., setting up a mobile phone or
managing a corporation). In spite of this heterogeneity there
is a list of five characteristic features that is uncontroversial
among researchers in the field (Frensch and Funke, 1995; Fischer
et al., 2012): A complex problem involves a relatively large
number of interrelated variables (complexity). Therefore, each
intervention to the complex problem has multiple consequences
and there may be far- and side-effects (interrelatedness). The
variables influence each other in ways that are not completely
transparent to the problem solver (intransparency). The state
of a complex problem is dynamically changing over time—
as a result of the problem solver’s actions or independent of
them (dynamics). Last but not least, in CPS there usually are
multiple, often contradictory goals to pursue (polytely). The
processes for coping with these characteristics are heterogeneous,
too: For example, identifying the most important variables in
a system is different from analysing input-output sequences
for underlying causal relations, which in turn is different from
deriving adequate actions based on the problem’s current state
and the problem solver’s assumptions about the underlying
causal structure (cf. Fischer, 2015). Of course, these cognitive
processes are expected to share variance in the efficiency of their
execution commonly referred to as the g-factor. Whether these
processes are correlated beyond g (indicating a one-dimensional
CPS ability) is still an open question. There is some evidence
that this is true for the facets of knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application in MicroDYN (Sonnleitner et al., 2013).
For other processes, this has not yet been shown and it is
conceivable that low correlations among different microworlds
are not always due to the low reliability of performance measures,
but also to differences in how the microworlds call for different
processes: Whereas the Tailorshop requires reduction of an
overwhelming amount of information and planning, MicroDYN
does much less so. Instead, solving MicroDYN items focuses
more on interactive hypothesis testing (Fischer et al., 2015).
So given these considerations, it does not seem reasonable to
devise a single valid operationalization of CPS, nor to construe
it as a one-dimensional ability construct. On the other hand,
the attempt to assess important aspects of CPS quantitatively
appears reasonable. From our point of view, this dilemma can be
solved by combining different aspects of CPS performance into
a competency (Fischer, 2015): A competency can be viewed as a
formative construct—encompassing a set of knowledge elements
and skills that need not necessarily be correlated (Jarvis et al.,
2003). A person who is able and willing to solve a wide range of
complex problems is competent in this regard. This argument is
related to the content validity of the CPS construct, and therefore
not backed up with empirical evidence. The predictive validity of
a formative CPS competency is still to be established.
(2) A closer look at MicroDYN shows that it meets only a few
of the criteria of complex problems. As the typical MicroDYN
simulation involves only up to three input variables and the
same number of dependent variables, it can be characterized
as moderately complex. Also, interrelatedness of variables is
mostly restricted to direct effects of independent variables: most
simulations involve no effects among the dependent variables
(side-effects). As a result, there are no conflicting goals—
highly characteristic for polytelic situations—in current instances
of the MicroDYN approach. Similarly, although MicroDYN
simulations could include eigendynamics, most of them don’t.
In Greiff and Funke (2010), no items with eigendynamics were
used; in Greiff et al. (2012) 64% of the Items in Study 1 and
42% of the Items in Study 2 involved eigendynamics. Moreover,
eigendynamics cannot unfold their full effects due to the short
input sequences of only four time steps in the solution phase.
Furthermore, as the causal structure is revealed in the solution
phase, intransparency is only given in the representation phase.
An overview of how the two most common microworlds meet
the five criteria is given in Table S1 (see Supplementary Material).
From our point of view, these are severe shortcomings, because
intransparency, conflicting goals, side effects, feedback loops,
and eigendynamics are highly characteristic aspects of complex
problems that require additional or different skills (Fischer et al.,
2015) than those required by MicroDYN. To investigate how
humans handle dynamic systems, longer simulations should be
used—preferably real-time driven (Schoppek and Fischer, 2014).
(3) Empirically, MicroDYN performance shares much
variance with measures of fluid intelligence (Wüstenberg et al.,
2012; Greiff and Fischer, 2013; Greiff et al., 2013). This is exactly
what one would expect of a reliable and valid measure of CPS
competency (Fischer et al., 2015). To justify the assumption
of a new psychometric construct, it must be shown that it can
account for incremental variance in adequate criteria. This has
been tried repeatedly, predominantly using school grades. The
modal result of these studies is that MicroDYN-CPS accounts for
5% variance in school grades incremental to fluid intelligence.
We challenge the value of school grades as primary criterion for
validating MicroDYN for two reasons: In contrast to MicroDYN,
they are highly aggregated measures. This violates Brunswik
symmetry, which requires that concepts be located on similar
levels of aggregation in order to validate each other (Wittmann
and Hattrup, 2004). Also, school grades are awarded based on
a number of poorly specified and heterogeneous principles—
problem solving being probably a minor one. Therefore, the
range of criteria for validating MicroDYN scores should be
extended. In particular, more complex and more dynamic
operationalizations of CPS, such as “Tailorshop” or “Dynamis2”
(Schoppek and Fischer, 2014) should be used for validation.
Recent research has shown that performance data with good
psychometric properties can be gathered with such microworlds
(Wittmann and Hattrup, 2004; Danner et al., 2011a). Ideally,
performance in MicroDYN accounts for incremental variance in
other microworlds, whereas additional variance can be explained
by other variables such as domain specific knowledge. That is
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FIGURE 1 | Functional relations between the simulated individual differences variables “Motivation” and “Intelligence” and the probabilities of starting
and accomplishing each process. For example, with a motivation of 0.0 (interpreted as a z-value) the probability of starting Process 1 equals 0.8.
to say we don’t agree with Greiff and Martin (2014) that these
variables reflect nothing but unsystematic variance. When such
validation studies reveal that MicroDYN explains substantial
unique variance in other complex systems, it can be used as an
efficient screening test for CPS competency, even if it covers only
a subset of the pertinent skills.
(4) Our last argument concerns the value of the psychometric
approach for analyzing CPS. Again, this has to do with the
question, if something multifaceted like CPS should be construed
as ability construct. Investigating how a construct contributes
to the prediction of interesting criteria is valuable, particularly
in applied contexts. But it is neither sufficient nor even very
helpful for identifying underlying processes. Let us clarify this
issue by means of a thought experiment: Consider a model
that simulates problem solving performance as a result of four
processes. Assume each process depends on motivation and
intelligence in the following way: The probability to begin the
process is determined by motivation and the probability to
accomplish the process successfully (given it has been begun) is
determined by intelligence. The functional relationships between
motivation, intelligence and the respective probabilities are
modeled with logistic functions like those shown in Figure 1.
The level of problem solving performance is represented by
the number of successfully accomplished processes3. Intelligence
and motivation are assumed to be normally distributed and
uncorrelated. Based on a simple model like this one may be
tempted to expect high correlations between problem solving
performance and intelligence and motivation, respectively.
We have simulated N = 1000 samples of n = 500
cases using the functions shown in Figure 1, calculated a
multiple regression analysis for each sample, and extracted the
standardized regression weights and the R2.
3The number of processes is arbitrary and the exact nature of the processes does
not matter for the point at hand. Please note that the results of the regression
analyses depend on the parameters of the logistic functions: Functions steeper than
those in Figure 1 result in higher R2s.
The mean regression weights in this simulation were β1 =
0.321 (SD= 0.04) for motivation and β2 = 0.254 (SD= 0.04) for
intelligence. The mean R2 was 0.170. Given that problem solving
in ourmodel solely depends on intelligence andmotivation, these
regression weights are remarkably low.
Two regression parameters and an R2-value cannot convey
complete information about the eight functions that produced
the results. Stated differently, many combinations of producing
functions will lead to the same psychometric results. On the other
hand, the thought experiment also shows that reliable assessment
of CPS (or its various aspects) is necessary for validating process
models. So we can conclude that the seemingly conflicting
process-oriented vs. psychometric approaches depend on each
other and therefore, should stimulate each other. However, to
make progress in understanding CPS, we need process-oriented
theories that make specific predictions. For example, it could be
construed within a dual processing framework (Evans Jonathan,
2012) or the joint role of motivation and executive control in CPS
could be investigated (Scholer et al., 2010).
As the main claim of this paper is that CPS should not
be construed as a single ability construct, we want to end it
with a preliminary list of exemplary constituents that should
be included in a comprehensive measure of CPS competency4.
Among the knowledge-related components of CPS competency
we distinguish (1) knowledge of concepts related to CPS and
(2) knowledge of strategies, tactics, and operations, and when to
apply them:
Knowledge of concepts:
• Causal loops (e.g., vicious circle), predator-prey systems,
exponential growth, saturation, etc.
• Delayed effects.
• Polytelic goal structures.
4Please note, there may be emotional and motivational constituents of CPS
competency as well, e.g., frustration tolerance, But given the cognitive nature of
our argument, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1669
Schoppek and Fischer CPS as complex phenomenon
Knowledge of strategies/tactics/operations:
• Analysis of effects and dependencies in order to determine
importance of variables as well as far- and side-effects (Dörner,
1997).
• Cross-impact analysis for identifying a variable’s importance
with respect to one’s goals (Vester, 2007).
• Control of variables strategy aka VOTAT (vary one thing at a
time).
• Applying input impulses and observing their propagation
through the system to identify eigendynamics.
• Utility analysis for coping with politely.
MicroDYN is sensitive to the control of variables strategy and
covers processes such as “interactively identifying causal relations
between pairs of variables” or “deriving a plan from causal
knowledge.” For these aspects it can be regarded as a useful, well
established measure. At the same time it is obvious that there are
other important components of CPS competency that cannot be
assessed with MicroDYN (cf. Fischer et al., 2015)—e.g., skills for
reducing complexity. To investigate and assess the set of skills,
that is required to solve a wide range of complex problems, a
greater variety of tests is necessary.
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